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Abstract: Civil war and genocide in the 1990-2000 period in Rwanda - a small, landlocked, 
densely populated country in Central Africa - have had differential economic impacts on the 
country’s provinces. The reasons for this are the death toll of the genocide, the location of 
battles, the waves of migration and the local resurgence of war. As a result, the labour/land and 
labour/capital ratios at the provincial level changed considerably during that period. Using two 
cross-sections, we find empirical evidence for convergence between provinces following the 
conflict shocks: previously richer provinces in the east and in the north of the country 
experienced lower, even negative, economic growth compared to the poorer western and 
southern provinces. This has in turn affected significantly the dynamics of household poverty 
in Rwanda in the same period. Using a small but unique panel of households surveyed before 
and after the conflict period, we find that households whose house was destroyed or who lost 
land ran a higher risk of falling into poverty. This was particularly the case for households who 
were land-rich before the genocide. We do not find this for the loss of household labour. In the 
latter case the effect depends on the violent or non-violent character of the loss.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The analysis of poverty dynamics has figured prominently in recent development economics 
research (e.g. Bane and Ellwood, 1986; Jenkins, 1998; Layte and Whelan, 2003). The 
identification of the socio-economic characteristics of individuals and households that move in 
and out of poverty is critical to the design of effective poverty-alleviating policies. These 
characteristics are also of considerable importance to the understanding of the impact of socio-
economic shocks on household welfare. Shocks such as price changes, sudden climatic 
changes, loss of work or illness are the subject of an extensive literature in economics.
4 
Developing countries are not only vulnerable to economic shocks but also to political shocks, 
ranging from violent protests and riots to coups, revolutions, civil wars, genocide and 
international wars. These affect millions of people every year across the world, resulting in lost 
opportunities in terms of economic growth and human development (Collier, 1999; Stewart et. 
al., 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The economic effects of conflict-induced shocks at the 
household level are, however, under-researched, as the impact of war, genocide or other types 
of violent conflict is typically analysed in the macro-economic literature and in cross-country 
studies (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 2001).  
 
Conflict-related shocks are likely to have significant effects on the poverty status of 
households. Wars, violence and genocide kill and injure people, destroy infrastructure, 
services, assets and livelihoods, displace populations, break social cohesion, institutions and 
norms and create fear and distrust. These effects are likely to push the worse-effected 
households into extreme forms of poverty and destitution, even if some of these households 
                                                 
4 On the impact of trade shocks on household poverty dynamics see McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2001) and 
Justino and Litchfield (2004). On the impact of weather shocks see, for instance, Paxson (1992) and Rosenzweig 
and Binswanger (1993). Frankenberg, Smith and Thomas (2003) and Lokshin and Ravallion (2005) examine the 
micro-level impact of financial crises. Gertler and Gruber (2002) provide empirical evidence on the impact of 
illness shocks on households’ livelihoods.    4
were not poor initially (see Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2004; Verwimp, 2005; 
Bundervoet and Verwimp, 2005; de Walque, 2006; Shemyakina, 2006; Justino, 2006). 
Violence often leads to the simultaneous destruction of assets and serious reductions in 
individual and household nutritional status (e.g. Alderman, Hoddinott and Kinsey, 2004; 
Bundervoet and Verwimp, 2005). This may push household into poverty, and possibly create 
poverty traps since under those circumstances the household would have little chance of 
recovering their economic status by resorting to productive means. Only a serious windfall 
(e.g. aid) would be able to lift the household back into recovery path (Dasgupta and Ray, 
1986).  
 
Minimising risky activities is probably the most widely observed effect in times of conflict, in 
the run-up to a war as well as in post-war coping strategies (e.g. Brück, 2004). Ex-ante, 
households that predicted occurrence of political violence will tend to hold a lower risk/lower 
return portfolio of activities in order to minimise their risk of serious income shortfall, even at 
the price of a lower average return. Morduch (1995) and Dercon (2002) show evidence for 
such behaviour in the presence of economic shocks. Ex-ante, households may also be able to 
save or build up assets as a precaution in the anticipation of a crisis, similarly to the 
mechanisms reported in Binswanger (1981) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993). The literature 
identifies also several ex-post coping strategies, i.e. strategies followed by households to 
smooth consumption and nutrition when shocks take place, even when formal credit and 
insurance markets are not available. These include the use of savings in the form of livestock 
and other assets (Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas, 1998; Dercon, 1996), attempts to diversify 
incomes (Barrett, Reardon and Webb, 2001; Dercon and Krishnan, 1996), resort to informal 
mutual support networks (e.g. family, friends, ethnic groups, neighbours, funeral societies, etc) 
(Platteau, 1991; Townsend, 1994; Grimard, 1997; Fafchamps and Lund, 2002; Dercon, 2005),   5
or intra-household decisions such as cutting meals and portions, relying on wild foods and 
moving to feeding camps (Dasgupta, 1993; Jalan and Ravallion, 2001; Dercon, 2005).  
 
Depending on its idiosyncratic or covariant nature of the shock, not all strategies will be 
effective in preventing more vulnerable households from falling into poverty. Shocks like war 
and genocide have a covariate character, but households with characteristics that are salient to 
the conflict may be particularly badly hit by the initial shock. For instance, while a high level 
of education may be a secure source of income in times of peace, it can become a liability in 
times of violence as it was the case during the Cultural Revolution in China or the Khmer 
Rouge regime in Cambodia (e.g. de Walque, 2006). In addition, known household insurance 
mechanisms may fail in a situation of conflict. According to Verpoorten (2005) Rwandan 
households did not in general sold cattle in response to conflict as they would do as a response 
to other shocks. Road unsafety prevented households most targeted by violence from accessing 
markets where cattle could be sold, at the same time that cattle was seen as an insecure asset, 
likely to be targeted by violence. Households less affected by violence sold their cattle but 
suffered from overall lower prices.  
 
Deaths and injuries are some of the most visible effects of violent conflicts, requiring 
significant adaptation within the household. Donovan et al (2003) research the effect of adult 
death on Rwandan households using self-reported coping strategies mentioned in interviews 
with 1500 rural households. They found that some households sell assets, adjust their crop mix, 
adjust area planted or/and hire in more labour. The effect on farm labour supply was dominant: 
6 out of 10 households reported a reduction in farm labour due to a male adult death and 5 out 
of 10 for a female adult death. Half of the households reported no effect on other income 
generating activities for a male death and 80% did so in case of a female adult death. Beegle 
(2005), researching the effect of adult mortality on the labour supply of Tanzanian households,   6
did not find an increase in hours farmed by surviving household members after an adult death, 
but found decreased activity in the farming of maize, cassava and beans. She draws attention to 
the fact that households experiencing decreased income or farm output after an adult death not 
necessarily experience a reduction of income, production or consumption per capita. Beegle 
links this to low marginal labour productivity in agriculture in the area of the survey (Kagera, 
northern Tanzania, bordering Rwanda). McKay and Loveridge (2005) make yet another 
observation: a reduction in income does not necessarily imply a worsening of the nutritional 
standard when the farm household substituted food crops for cash crops. 
 
This paper draws on the above literature to analyse the impact of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda 
on household income and poverty dynamics: who stayed poor, who moved into poverty, who 
moved out of poverty? We model empirically household poverty transitions before and after 
the 1994 genocide. Our main interest is to uncover potentially important differences between 
the effects of conflict-induced shocks on household welfare compared to well-known economic 
shocks: Does the violent death of a household member affect welfare similarly to non-violent 
death? How will loss of land or the destruction of one’s house affect household welfare? We 
aim to add further insight to the literature understanding the difference between demographic 
and economic shocks (Pitt and Rosenzweig, 1986; Kochar, 1995; Beegle, 2005). 
 
We start by examining the economic impact of conflict at the provincial level, focussing on the 
particular process of income convergence that has taken place in Rwanda following the 1990-
1994 events. Subsequently, we link these to changes in poverty at the household level. Our 
empirical analysis relies on two nationwide cross sectional data sets, one with data collected in 
1990, the second with data from 2000, in order to trace changes in poverty at the national level. 
In addition, we make use of a small but unique household panel data, which followed the same 
Rwandan households before and after the 1994 genocide in two provinces, Gitarama and   7
Gikongoro (situated in central and south Rwanda). Our empirical strategy is based on the 
estimation of dynamic poverty transition functions, which in turn will be compared to reduced-
form models of changes in income. We address in detail the potential problem of attrition in 
panel datasets such as the one we use.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief history of 
conflict in Rwanda. Section 3 shows the differential economic impact the conflict had on 
Rwanda’s provinces and makes the case for convergence. In section 4, we move from the 
provincial to the household level. We present a poverty and inequality profile of Rwandan 
households, using two nationwide cross-sectional surveys, one with data collected before the 
genocide, the other with data collected after the genocide. In section 5, we use a household 
panel dataset to analyse household poverty dynamics in Rwanda between 1990 and 2002. We 
discuss and correct for potential attrition problems in our data set. In section 6, we present and 
analyse results obtained from both dynamic poverty transition functions and reduced-form 
income models. Section 7 summarises the main results and concludes the paper. 
 
2. A short history of conflict in Rwanda 
 
Between April and July 1994, at least 500 000 Tutsi (Des Forges, 1999)
5 or about 75% of the 
Tutsi population, together with many Hutu who were known to be opponents of the 
Habyarimana regime, were killed by the Rwandan military (FAR), local police, national guard 
and militia called Interahamwe. A few years before, in October 1990, a group of rebels 
consisting of Tutsi refugees who had left Rwanda during the 1959-1962 revolution, together 
with their offspring, attacked Rwanda from Uganda. What followed was a civil war between 
the Rwandan armed forces (Forces Armées Rwandaises, FAR) and the rebel army (Rwandan 
                                                 
5 Other scholars, such as Prunier (1995), put the death toll between 500.000 and 800.000.    8
Patriotic Front, RPF), in which the civilian population in the north of Rwanda was the main 
victim. While the RPF claimed to fight against the dictatorship of president Habyarimana, the 
latter claimed to represent the majority of the people. The battles between both armies were 
paralleled by peace negotiations and third party interventions. In order to understand the drama 
of this period, it is essential to know its history. 
 
The ethnic composition of the population had been a major issue in Rwandan politics since the 
time of colonisation. The Belgian colonizer had first favoured the Tutsi ruling class because 
they were considered racially superior to the Hutu, who were considered a people of 
cultivators. In the 1950’s, with the spread of anti-colonial and independence movements, the 
ruling Tutsi began to claim the independence of Rwanda. At that time, a Hutu counter-elite was 
given the chance to study at catholic seminars. With Belgian military and political aid, this new 
elite of Hutu leaders succeeded in overturning the ruling Tutsi regime and replace it by the 
leadership of the Parmehutu, the party for the emancipation of the Hutu. G. Kayibanda, a 
seminarian, became the first president. The ethnic divide however remained and was even 
strengthened. The new rulers, at the national as well as at the local level, established their 
power by removing all Tutsi from positions of power. Ordinary Tutsi who were not associated 
with political power became targets of reprisal and murder.
6  
 
In 1973, a group of army officers close to Juvénal Habyarimana took power via a coup d’état. 
They were frustrated by the monopolisation of power by the group led by Kayibanda, whose 
power base was the central prefecture of Gitarama. Habyarimana’s support group, originated 
from northern Rwanda, saw all benefits of power go to the people from Gitarama. After the 
coup d’état, Habyarimana became the new president. He established the MRND (Mouvement 
                                                 
6 For detailed treatment of the history of Rwanda, we refer to books written by Prunier (1995), Newbury (1988), 
De Lame (1996), Reyntjens (1994), among others.   9
Révolutionnaire National pour le Dévéloppement), the single party to which every Rwandan 
was supposed to belong to by birth. Aided by high prices for the coffee in the late seventies, 
the country’s main export crop, and generous donor support, Habyarimana was liked, or at 
least not contested, by a large part of the population. Ethnicity was made a central political 
issue. Habyarimana maintained a system of ethnic identity cards and forbade officers and 
soldiers to marry Tutsi wives. In order to control population movements, he set up a detailed 
system of registration and reporting of demographic changes at the local level. He also had 
every adult participate in the Umuganda  (weekly communal labour), and institutionalized 
weekly animation sessions in honour of himself (Verwimp, 2003). 
 
A key characteristic of the Habyarimana regime was its doctrine on the relation between 
population and land. The president had never been an advocate of a family planning policy. On 
several occasions he declared that children were the wealth of every Rwandan family. Groups 
set up by the Ministry of the Interior attacked pharmacies that sold condoms. The president 
was fully supported by the Catholic Church, which was omnipresent in Rwanda. The fertility 
rate of Rwandan women was among the highest in the world and the average size of cultivated 
land per family was shrank rapidly from 1.2 ha in 1984 to 0.9 ha in 1990 (National Agricultural 
Surveys, 1984 and 1989-1991). In that period, many families had not enough land to earn a 
living and feed their families. In 1986, when discussing the fate of the 1959-1962 refugees, the 
Central Committee of the MRND said that their return was not possible because the country 
was overpopulated. After this, the Tutsi refugees in the Diaspora, and especially in Uganda, 
started to mobilise militarily against Habyarimana. 
 
During the civil war preceding the genocide (1990-1994), a number of local massacres 
occurred in which a total of 2000 Tutsi were killed. These massacres were not spontaneous 
outburst of violence from a poor peasant population but were organised by the national power   10
elite. On April 6
th 1994, Habyarimana’s plane was shot down. After that, the genocide broke 
out. 
 
A substantial part of the FAR, together with several hundreds of thousands of civilian refugees 
fleeing the war, was pushed into neighbouring Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. For two years, a 
mix of civilian refugees and warrior-refugees (ex-FAR) resided in refugee camps along the 
border between Zaire, on the one hand, and Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, on the other hand. 
In November 1996, the Rwandan patriotic army (RPA, successor of the RPF) attacked the 
Zairian camps thereby killing both thousands of armed ex-FAR, as well as unarmed civilians. 
The majority of the surviving refugees then returned to Rwanda. A sizable part of ex-FAR, 
Interahamwe and genuine refugees fled deeper into Zairian territory. During the subsequent 
years, 1997-2000, most remaining refugees had either died or were repatriated. These conflicts 
had considerable impacts on a population already living well below international living 
standards. 
 
The war and genocide had an unequal impact on Rwanda’s provinces, an impact that can be 
attributed to four major events that occurred during this period: war in 1990-1993, genocide 
1994, mass migration 1994-1998 and (counter) insurgency 1997-1999. The war, the genocide 
and the (counter) insurgency caused massive losses of population. The mass emigration to 
Congo also ended in large population losses. This period was also characterised by mass 
immigration of former refugees from neighbouring countries. These four events or shocks, 
together with the high natural growth of Rwanda’s population, were the main culprits for the 
observed differential population changes in the provinces. Later on in the paper, we will 
discuss the results of field work in two of Rwanda’s provinces, Gitarama and Gikongoro. In 
order to insert these provinces in the context of overall Rwanda, we compare them with other 
provinces in the next section, using the four shocks mentioned above.    11
 
3. Geography of conflict 
 
3.1 The impact of the conflict on Rwanda’s provinces 
 
Map 1 shows the progress of the civil war. In the 1990-1993 period, battles were concentrated 
in the north (Byumba and Ruhengeri). At the start of the genocide, the FPR made a circular 
move around the capital Kigali. Coming from Byumba, they first captured the eastern 
provinces of Kibungo and rural Kigali, encircling the capital and moving forward to Gitarama 
and Butara. In May 1994 , the FPR was prevented to enter Gikongoro, Cyangugu and Kibuye 
provinces by the French army serving under UN mandate in Operation Turquoise. In June and 
July the FPR captured Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. This war and subsequent events affected 
considerably the economic position of Rwanda’s provinces. 
 
Table 1a depicts the economic impact of the conflict on a series of labour/capital ratios at the 
provincial level. The differential economic impact of the conflict is illustrated by changes in 
the labour/land ratio, the labour/cattle ratio, and the percentage of ‘villages’ (cells) with new 
settlements (imidigudu). In the absence of technological change (which is a safe assumption for 
rural post-conflict Rwanda), economic growth is determined by the relative scarcity of factors 
of production. Labour, land and cattle are straightforward indicators to measure the changes in 
labour to capital ratio in a land-scare, capital poor, densely populated economy. Higher values 
for the different ratios in Table 1a indicate that the ratio has worsened over time. The number 
of new settlements is also introduced as an indicator because it captures to a certain degree the 
need for housing and other infrastructure (destruction of physical capital) during the civil war 
as well as the level of social capital in these locations. As the spatial structure is remodelled 
with these new settlements and citizens had to move in these new settlements with many of   12
them former refugees, high values indicate low degrees of social capital. As with other forms 
of capital, low levels of social capital impact negatively on economic growth, considering the 
lack of technological progress and the scarcity of capital.  
 
In addition, table 1b shows the effect of the four shocks: genocide, civil war, immigration and 
(counter) insurgency. We describe the events in each province in subsequent paragraphs below 
and in the next section. The shock index in Table 1b is the sum of the effect of each of the 
shocks on the provincial economy, taking account of the scarcity of capital and the abundance 
of labour in rural Rwanda.
7  
 
The provinces of Byumba, Ruhengeri, Kibungo and Rural Kigali situated in the north and east 
of Rwanda were the scene of the invasion and early advancement of the RPF. Byumba suffered 
the impact of war in the 1990-1993 period due to battles taking place between both armies. Its 
population fled to Kigali. Not many Tutsi lived in Byumba before the war and genocide. After 
1994, many Tutsi from neighbouring countries (old caseload refugees) resettled in Byumba. 
Net population growth in Byumba in the period between 1990 and 2002 was 11%. Kibungo 
and Rural Kigali were the scene of horrific massacres and killings during the genocide as both 
had a sizeable (but lower then the southern provinces, see below) Tutsi population. They were 
also the scene of fierce battles between the RPF and the FAR in 1994, accompanied by killings 
of Hutu civilians. After the genocide, many old case-load refugees resettled in Kibungo. Net 
population growth in Kibungo was 8% between 1990 and 2002. The provinces of Gisenyi and 
Ruhengeri did not loose many people in the genocide because very few Tutsi lived there. Both 
provinces did suffer from the war before the genocide when their population fled to Kigali and 
especially from the (counter) insurgency in the 1997-1999 period when the RPF was fighting 
the remains of the FAR who attacked Rwanda from the Congo. Population growth remained 
                                                 
7 The assumptions made and the exact composition of the shock index is explained under table 1b.    13
high in these provinces, whereas the degree of destruction of the capital stock (in terms of 
cattle) was higher then average, as is also the case for the number of new settlements. 
 
The provinces of Butare, Gikongoro,
8 Cyangugu and Kibuye in the south and west of the 
country had the highest number of Tutsi before the genocide. In those provinces, the genocide 
took its largest toll. Butare also suffered Hutu casualties along its border with Rural Kigali 
when the FPR approached. Gikongoro, Cyangugu and Kibuye experienced very few Hutu 
deaths because of the operation Turquoise which prevented the FPR from entering these 
provinces.
9 Resettlement of old caseload refugees was almost non-existent in these provinces. 
Net population growth was therefore very low in Kibuye and Gikongoro and even negative in 
Butare. This testifies the level of population loss during the genocide. As an exception, net 
population growth is high in Cyangugu is high due to the influx of new caseload refugees from 
the Congo. 
 
The unfolding of the genocide in the province of Gitarama in Central Rwanda
10 was different 
from other provinces. More Tutsi were saved in Gitarama compared to other provinces, for 
historical reasons, such as intermarriage, but also because of the resistance of Hutu and Tutsi at 
several locations in the province (Des Forges, 1999). Gitarama was the scene of fighting 
between enemy armies, but fighting was not as fierce as in the east. Killings of Tutsi and Hutu 
took a lot of casualties, but less compared to the south in the case of Tutsi, and less compared 
to the east in the case of Hutu (Verwimp, 2003). Few old case load refugees resettled in this 
province.  
 
                                                 
8 This is one of the two provinces in the panel (see section 5). 
9 In table 1b this means that these provinces get the 0 value for the impact of the civil war shock, on both factors 
of production. 
10 This is the second province in the panel (see section 5).   14
3.2 Convergence between poorer and richer provinces 
 
Before 1990, the southern provinces were much poorer compared to the northern and eastern 
provinces, as shown in table 2. The average income per adult equivalent in Kibungo, the richest 
province, was three times that in Gikongoro, the poorest province. In 2000, Kibungo was still 
the richest province, but the average household was only 1.5 times richer than a household in 
Butare, now the poorest province. Interestingly, Rwanda’s high performing provinces prior to 
the genocide (Kibungo in the east and Ruhengeri in the north) have experienced low economic 
growth in the conflict decade. Provinces that were poor, prior to the war and genocide, are still 
poorer than the Rwandan average, but they have experienced much stronger economic growth 
than the other provinces (see table 2). In real terms, the growth of average income was negative 
in the two richest provinces and was highest in the three poorest provinces. These figures 
suggest that income convergence has taken place in Rwanda between poor and rich provinces. 
Following the convergence literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992), Figure 1 plots initial 
income and the growth rate in one figure, demonstrating convergence. 
 
The provinces that performed better before the genocide (Kibungo, Rural Kigali, Ruhengeri, 
Buymba) were the scene of major battles between enemy armies, resulting in serious damage 
to the capital stock (as illustrated in tables 1a and 1b). Ruhengeri saw battles as recently as 
1999 - just before the survey from which the income data are drawn - took place. Many people 
in this province were displaced during the decade and unlike the other provinces were still 
living in refugee settlements at the time of the survey. On all accounts, be it increased labour 
supply, destruction of the cattle stock and the percentage of new settlements, Ruhengeri is on 
top of the list (meaning negative effect on the economy for all indicators). By 2000, Ruhengeri   15
had not recovered from its war experience.
11 To a lesser degree, the same story applies to the 
other provinces in north and east Rwanda: increases in labour supply, destruction of the cattle 
stock and new settlements are higher than average. After 1994, Rural Kigali and Kibungo were 
the scene of mass resettlement of former refugees and Uganda based exiles, putting strain on 
land resources.  
 
The opposite story can be told for the poor provinces in the south and in the west. First, these 
provinces did not suffer directly from displacement and battles in the 1990-1993 period, as 
these were restricted to the northern provinces. Second, these provinces had the largest 
percentage of Tutsi in Rwanda, resulting in unprecedented loss of population. Population loss 
in these provinces in 1994 is estimated around 10 to 15% of the population (or 75% of the 
Tutsi population). Thirdly, these provinces were not the scene of intense battles between the 
FPR and the FAR in 1994, meaning that the capital stock was not damaged to the degree it was 
damaged in the north and the east. And fourthly, there was no mass resettlement of former 
refugees from Uganda in these provinces. As a result the labour/land and labour/capital ratios 
remained more or less unaffected after the conflict (see tables 1a, 1b and 2).
12 Importantly, the 
average rank of the poor provinces, when taking the three ratios into account, is well below the 
average rank of the rich provinces (higher rank indicating a comparatively worsening 
situation).  
 
Table 1c shows the degree of rank correlation between the income in 1990 (in adult 
equivalent), the growth rate over the conflict period, the changes in the labour/capital ratios and 
                                                 
11 For a review of existing sources on displacement in northern Rwanda we refer to a report by the Global IDP 
Project, “Ensuring durable solutions for Rwanda’s displaced people: a chapter close to early, July 2005 
12 It is not the case that all ratios for all provinces in the north have deteriorated more than average and it is 
equally so not the case that all ratios for all provinces in the south have performed above average. What we want 
to demonstrate, with the few data points that we have, is that on average, the economies of the northern and 
eastern provinces have suffered more (increases in labour supply and destruction of capital) from the decade of 
conflict compared to the economies in the southern and western provinces.   16
the shock index of the authors. The Spearman correlation coefficient is statistically significant 
on all indicators and supports the story explained above and depicted in Figure 2: the impact of 
a decade of conflict on the rural economy has been such that the poor provinces have grown 
more than the rich.
13 This effect is likely to have affected profoundly poverty patterns and 
economic structures of Rwandan households.  
 
4. Poverty profile for 1990 and 2000 
 
4.1. Poverty and extreme poverty lines 
 
The previous section showed a picture of national economic convergence across Rwandan 
provinces following the 1994 genocide. How did these changes affect the poor? According to 
the 2002 Poverty Profile of Rwanda, a government approved document published by the 
Ministry of Finance, 60.3% of the Rwandan population was poor in that year with 65.7% in 
rural areas, 19.4% in urban areas outside the capital and 12.3% in Kigali. As for extreme 
poverty (measured by a food-only poverty), the 2002 Profile sets the number at 41.6% 




The calculation of the above Poverty Profile was based on a nationwide household survey, the 
EICV (Enquête Intégrale des Conditions de Vie), conducted by the Department of Statistics of 
the Ministry of Finance in the period July 2000-July 2001 in rural Rwanda and October 1999-
July 2000 in urban Rwanda. The EICV is a nationwide, multiple purpose household survey 
                                                 
13 We are interested in the relative position (the ranking) of each province on the different indicators, not in the 
Pearson correlation coefficient of the indicators. 
14 The 2000 poverty line was set at 64.000 RwF per adult equivalent per year, based on a daily food intake of 
2.500 Kcal (resulting in a 45.000 RwF food poverty line) and 29.4% non-food expenditures (see section 4.2 for 
details). Ministry of Finance, a Poverty Profile for Rwanda, Kigali, February 2002   17
with 6240 rural and urban households. One generally uses income or (food) consumption as 
indicators of poverty and extreme poverty. Both have advantages and disadvantages (e.g. 
Kanbur and Squire, 1999). The 2002 Profile uses consumption as its indicator of poverty and 
extreme poverty, but the EICV contains also data on income. 
 
In this paper, we compare poverty and extreme poverty in Rwanda over time. In addition to the 
rural 2000-2001 EICV data, we make use of the 1989-1991 DSA (Département de Statistiques 
Agricole). The latter survey was implemented by Ministry of Agriculture in the 1989-1991 
period. The DSA data were collected from 1248 rural households in all prefectures (now called 
provinces). In order to get a sample that was representative for Rwanda as a whole, for each of 
the 10 prefectures and for each of the 5 agro-ecological zones, a stratified random sampling 
procedure was used. This resulted in the selection of 78 sectors where each sector represented a 
cluster of 16 households. The smaller prefectures were represented by 6 clusters, the larger by 
10 clusters. Since data collection for the 1991a and the 1991b crop seasons were disrupted by 
the war in northern Rwanda, the most complete data are for crop year 1990. This is the year we 
will use in our comparison with the EICV. Below we describe the steps taken to ensure 
comparability between the two surveys. McKay and Loveridge (2005) in their exploratory 
analysis have used the same data and write that the income data from both surveys can be 
fruitfully compared.  
 
4.2. The approach taken 
 
We use an income variable to compare levels of poverty and extreme poverty across the two 
surveys. Since the 1990 survey did not collect data on non-food consumption, we have to 
restrict our comparison to income poverty and extreme income poverty. In order to compare 
the two cross-sections, we had to make sure we could derive similar welfare variables in the   18
two years. Starting from the 2002 Profile, we looked for all consumption variables that were 
included in the 2000 as well as in the 1990 surveys. The food poverty line set by the Ministry 
of Finance in 2000 was 2500 calories per adult equivalent per day. This was done by taking the 
consumption basket of the poorest 60% of the population, which contained information on 
what quantities the poor consume for each key product. By inputting a caloric value to the 
consumption of each food item, one could ultimately derive the monetary value of a basket of 
2500 calories per day per adult. However, neither the EICV nor the DSA had complete 
quantity and price information on all the consumption items in this basket. 
 
As the 2000 survey was the most complete, we looked for all food consumption items in the 
1990 survey that were also in the 2000 survey. We then calculated the caloric value of each 
those items and arrived at 2088 calories per day per adult. This means that we found 
information on prices and quantities in both surveys for 83.5% of the calories set as the food 
poverty line in the 2002 Poverty Profile. The reason for this is that Rwandans derive a large 
part of the calories from a few crops like beans, bananas, potatoes, sweet potatoes, sorghum 
and manioc. Production and consumption data for such main crops is present in both surveys.  
The monetary value of this reduced food poverty line was 95.5 RwF per day in 2000 and 25.7 
RwF in 1990. On an annual basis, this food poverty line for 2000 then equals 35.000 RwF and 
9.400 RwF in 1990. These two lines will form the basis of our comparison. The 2002 Poverty 
Profile found that households around the food poverty line devote on average 29.4% of their 
budget to non-food items. This is then considered as a minimum of non-food expenditures to 
escape poverty. For the poverty line, we then arrive at 49.575 RwF per adult per year (35.000 / 
(1-0.294) for 2000 and 13.300 RwF (9400 / (1-0.294) for 1990. 
 
Income contains crop consumption from own production (main crops such as beans, bananas, 
sorghum, manioc, potatoes, sweet potatoes and rice). The income variable also includes the   19
sales of all crops, sales of beer and juice, off-farm income, sales of livestock, milk and eggs, 
and transfers received. Items that were not included in the income variable are income from 
renting out livestock, renting out land, sharecropping out land, income from some livestock 
products (buttermilk, butter, cheese, leather and skin, manure), income from renting out 
equipment, income from other agricultural products and the sales of some home processed 
products (sales of maize flour, sorghum flour, cassava flour, soya flour, peanut flour) and 
finally miscellaneous incomes. As said, these items were left out because this data was not 
collected in the 1990 survey. Inevitable this leads to an underestimation of income, in 2000 as 
well as in 1990.
15  
 
Items not included in our income variable for 2000 represent, on average, 1.6% of total 
household income. In table 3b, we investigate whether or not the left out income sources are 
concentrated among the rich or the poor. This may give us a better idea of the impact of the 
underestimation of income on our poverty statistics. Underestimation was largest for the 
poorest income quintile (averaging 3.2% of income), but even in this quintile, income was not 
underestimated for over 90% of the households. Given that all the households in this quintile 
fall below the extreme poverty line and given the marginal underestimation of income when 
leaving out certain income categories not measured in 1990, we believe underestimation not to 
be an important issue for our analysis.  
 
4.3. Profile of poverty for rural Rwanda 
 
                                                 
15 Income is commonly under-recorded in household surveys as it is usually difficult to record all sources of 
income and all forms of income (see Deaton, 1997).    20
The poverty profile for rural Rwanda using sample characteristics in 1990 and 2000 is 
presented in table 3a and 3b. In the whole of the rural areas, poverty increased by 2.3%.
16 The 
small increase of the headcount over time is not a country-wide phenomenon; it is marked by 
large differences across provinces. Poverty decreased substantially in Gikongoro, Cyangugu 
and Kibuye. It increased substantially in rural Kigali, Kibungo and Byumba. Smaller changes 
occurred in the other provinces. The head count remained the same for households with a male 
head, but increased for female-headed households. It also increased across the education 
spectrum, with the most educated having the lowest headcount. Poverty decreased for 
agricultural labourers and businessmen and women, and increased for government officials, the 
latter having the lowest head count among all occupations. The poverty gap and squared 
poverty gap (not shown in the tables but available upon request) yield similar trends over time, 
i.e. 2000 fared worse than 1990, both with strong provincial differences. The indices for 
extreme poverty show similar tendencies for overall poverty.  
 
As the two surveys we are using are cross-sections, they do not allow a dynamic analysis of 
poverty over time. That task will be taken up through the use of a smaller household panel data 
in the next section. The provincial level changes of poverty and extreme poverty are not 
independent of the major events that hid Rwanda in the nineties, as described above. In a cross-
section it is however difficult to determine the cause(s) of such profound changes. Suffice here 
to note the extent of the changes and their compatibility with the convergence story in section 
3: provinces which experienced a decline (increase) in poverty in 2000 are exactly those 
provinces which were poorer (richer) in 1990.  
 
                                                 
16 Only the EICV has data on urban poverty, making a comparison of urban poverty over time not possible. 10% 
of the population lived and lives in urban areas. Poverty in the urban areas is lower then in the rural areas. The 
poverty head count for Rwanda overall is then a few percentage point lower then the head count for the rural areas 
only.   21
Together with the geographic profile of poverty, we examined also the distribution of income. 
As table 3b clearly shows, average income increased over time, but this increase only benefited 
the richest income quintile. McKay and Loveridge (2005), working with quartiles, report a 
similar trend. The worsening of the income distribution was already visible in table 3a, where 
we computed the Gini coefficient for income distribution in rural Rwanda as well as per 
province. Thus, following the political events in Rwanda in the 1990s, poor provinces have 
become richer and richer provinces have become poorer, but all provinces have become more 
unequal.  
 
5. Evidence from a panel dataset 1990-2002 
 
5.1 Description of the data 
 
In the first months of 2002, one of the authors of this paper (Verwimp) collected household 
demographic, economic and agricultural data from a subset of the households interviewed in 
the 1989-1991 survey, thus constituting a panel data set which spans the period of the war and 
genocide.
17 This survey, the Post-Conflict Survey on the Rural Household Economy, was in 
itself the second stage of a tracing exercise undertaken in 2000 (Verwimp, Genocide Transition 
Survey, 2003 and 2005). In 2002, 258 households were interviewed in 16 clusters in 
Gikongoro and Gitarama, covering all the clusters in these two provinces that were included in 
the DSA. The first is a poor province in the south of Rwanda, heavily affected by the genocide 
and the second is located in central Rwanda (see section 3.1). The data do not cover the new 
immigrants after 1994, only households that were already residing in Rwanda in 1990.  
                                                 
17 This fieldwork was organised and undertaken by P.Verwimp in cooperation with M.Verpoorten, a PhD student  
from the KU Leuven. This research was financed by the Belgian Department for International Cooperation. 
Berlage, L, Verpoorten, M, Verwimp, Ph. (2003) provides the first results from this dataset. See Berlage a.o., 
Rural Households under extreme stress, report for the Flemish Interuniversity Council and the Belgian 
Depertment of International Cooperation, September. Available at www.hicn.org   22
 
We define a household to be part of the panel if the head of the household in 2002 was a 
member of the household in the 243 household sample interviewed in 1990. This was the case 
for 186 of the 258 households interviewed in 2002. In further eight cases, data on income 
sources or other important variables were missing in either 2002 or 1990. This gave us a final 
panel of 178 households, or 73% of the original 1990 sample. Although this is a smaller data 
set compared to other panel surveys, it is the only data set that spans the period before and after 
the genocide in Rwanda, thus constituting a unique panel. The panel data sample is not 
representative for the whole of Rwanda, but contains invaluable information on Rwandan 
households during a key episode in world affairs. These data cover two entire prefectures, 
Gikongoro and Gitarama.  
 
As with the cross-sectional analysis, our analysis is based on an income variable that is the 
same for both rounds of the survey. In both surveys, household income is the sum of 
production for own consumption, crop sales, sales of home manufactured beverages (banana 
and sorghum beer), wages from off-farm work and sales of livestock products.
18 The data 
collected apply to the period October 2001-March 2002, in effect only one year after the rural 
EICV. Since we work have panel data for one season, we divided the poverty lines calculated 
for the two cross-sections in half. For both years we used the same equivalence scales.  
 
5.2 Attrition in the household panel  
 
                                                 
18 There are two differences between the income variable used in the cross-sections and in the small panel data 
analysis. For the panel, the second round only collected data for one season and does not have data on transfers 
received from others. Using the first wave, which did have transfer data, we know that the latter leads to an 
underestimation of income of on average 2.7%. Since we use the same season in both years, seasonality is not an 
issue in the panel data analysis.   23
The possibility that estimates may be biased as a consequence of selective sample attrition is a 
major concern in the panel data literature. Alderman and his colleagues (IFPRI, 2000), studied 
the extent and implications of attrition for three longitudinal household surveys from Bolivia, 
Kenya and South Africa. They found that the means for outcome and family background 
variables differed significantly between attritors and non-attritors. Multivariate estimates of 
behavioural relations however were not significantly affected by attrition. Fitzgerald et al. 
(1998) studied attrition in the Michigan Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID) and found a 
50% sample loss between 1968 and 1989. Despite the large amount of attrition, they do not 
find strong evidence that attrition distorted the representativeness of the PDID. Maluccio 
(IFPRI, 2000), working with panel data for an income study in Kwazulu Natal, used Heckman 
selection procedures to study attrition bias. Using a Hausman test, he rejects the equality of 
coefficients between the corrected and the uncorrected models, suggesting the importance of 
attrition bias. Alderman, Hoddinot and Kinsey (2004) in a paper on the long term 
consequences of early childhood malnutrition, find that the initial health status does not explain 
attrition once they control for other child and household characteristics. 
 
In our sample, the main concern is that observable or non-observable characteristics of 
households that dropped from our sample are significantly different from the panel households. 
There can be several reasons for selective sample attrition in our data. First, households who 
dropped from the analysis may be poorer in 1990, resulting in a panel whose average income in 
1990 is biased upward. This would cause bias in our analysis as we are particularly interested 
in poverty dynamics. Second, households who dropped from the analysis may have had an 
older head in 1990 making it more likely that he/she will die and that the household will be less 
likely to be traced again. As households with older heads are in general wealthier, such 
selective sample selection may result in a panel whose average income in 1990 is biased 
downward. Third, households were dropped from the analysis because they were targeted in   24
the genocide. The main reason for this would be that they had a Tutsi head of the household 
because the genocide mainly killed Tutsi. And fourth, apart from ethnicity, age of the head or 
income, there can be other observed and unobserved household characteristics responsible for 
selective sample attrition.  
 
In tables 4a and 4b, we present an analysis of a potential attrition problem in our panel data set. 
Attrition in our sample is at 27% of the original 1990 sample. This is relatively high compared 
to other surveys (see Thomas, Frankenberg and Smith, 2000 for a review), but not surprisingly 
high given the extent of the genocide and the war in Rwanda. The Government of Rwanda 
estimated in 2003 that 1 million people (13.3 % from 7.5 million) died in 1994. Households 
who dropped from our analysis had a smaller size in 1990, had more female heads of 
households, had less land to cultivate, had a smaller income and were more likely to reside in 
Gikongoro province. When we account for the smaller size of the household – as we do in our 
analysis by using income per adult equivalents – table 4a shows that there is no significant 
difference anymore between the households in and out the panel on land size and income. 
Households in our panel are larger, have more income and more land, but the t-statistic is not 
significant anymore when we compare these characteristics in terms of adult equivalents. 
 
Given the fact that the genocide particularly affected the Tutsi population of Rwanda, one 
would expect that households with a Tutsi head would drop out of the survey. It is indeed 
estimated that 75% of the entire Tutsi community living in Rwanda before the genocide was 
killed. However, as Des Forges (1999) and Verwimp (2003) show, the death rate per ethnic 
group differs substantially per province, with Butare and Gikongoro in the south particularly 
hard hit and Kibungo and Gitarama counting fewer Tutsi victims. The main reason for this is 
that the genocide in Gitarama and Kibungo was not completely carried out. In Gitarama, this 
was because of the initial passive and active resistance against the genocide whereas in   25
Kibungo it was due to the early arrival of the RPF. Since most of the Tutsi households in the 
1990 sample reside in Gitarama, they had a comparatively higher survival chance. As a result, 
our panel counts less households with a Tutsi head of the household then the original 1990 
sample, but the difference is statistically not significant. 
 
The remaining, statistically significant differences between panel and attrited households at the 
univariate level are the sex of the head of the household, the age of the head, the number of 
cattle, the province of residence and the loss of female adults. In table 4b, we perform a probit 
analysis following Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1998) in order to investigate further 
whether these variables are able to explain attrition.  
 
Table 4b presents three probit models. The first model shows that household income and 
household size are statistically significant in the attrition regression, as expected from the 
results in table 4a. The Chi-square test however does not indicate a good fit. In the second 
model, we used income per adult equivalent together with household characteristics that 
proved significantly different between attrited and non-attrited households from table 4a (age, 
sex, land size, cattle, residence) or characteristics we expect to be relevant to explain attrition 
given the nature of the conflict (ethnicity). Income per adult equivalent is not statistically 
significant and the fit only improves slightly. The third model adds two shocks to the 
regression – violent and non-violent death of adult females – the relevance of which was also 
visible in table 4a. This exercise shows improvement in the fit of the regression. It leaves 
household size, land size, the age of the head of the household, together with both shocks, as 
the variables that significantly matter in explaining attrition. In our subsequent empirical 
analysis in section 6 we will correct for attrition bias on observables using a Heckman sample 
selection model to correct for attrition in income regressions. 
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5.3 Poverty profiles in Gikongoro and Gitarama 
 
The number of households below the poverty line in the two provinces included in the sample 
increased from 73.1% in 1990 to 75.3% in 2002. Moreover, the increase in poverty in the two 
provinces between these two years is robust to the choice of poverty line: Figure 3 shows that 
poverty was always higher in 2002 than in 1990 in Rwanda up to a very large poverty line. 
These estimates hide considerable variations across the sample. Increases in the number of 
poor (and extremely poor) households in 2002 were particularly noticeable amongst smaller 
Hutu households headed by younger males. In 2002, education keeps a household out of 
poverty, but less compared to 1990.  
 
Table 5 shows also that the number of poor households decreased quite significantly in the 
province of Gikongoro in that time period, whereas it increased from 62.4% to around 80% in 
Gitarama province. Estimates using a lower food poverty line illustrate a similar picture: the 
number of extremely poor households decreased in Gikongoro from 83.3% to 56.7%, whereas 
it increased from 44.9% to 72% in Gitarama. The difference in the income and poverty path for 
Gikongoro in our small panel is similar to the path in the cross-sections, but more outspoken. 
For Gitarama province, the path of extreme poverty is similar in the small panel and the cross-
sections, but poverty in Gitarama in the small panel is higher than in the cross-section. We 
recall here that the small panel includes only households that lived in the same location before 
the genocide. Recall that, in contrast to the cross-sections, the small panel does not offer a 
representative sample of households residing in the provinces in the year 2002 due to drop-out 
rates from the survey and immigration. 
 
As in the cross-sections, both provinces in the small panel registered an increase in income 
inequality between the two years (table 5). Increases in income inequality in Rwanda were   27
more or less visible across all population groups analysed in table 5. Interestingly, as table 6 
shows, the main sources of inequality in Rwanda in 2002 were education of the head of the 
household, household size and land size. This is comparable to the situation in 1990, but then 
location of residence was among the top sources of inequality, not land size. The lesser 
importance of the province of residence as source of inequality relates closely to our 
convergence story. The result for land size in table 6 points at the increased importance of land 
ownership as a source of inequality in Rwanda in 2002. 
 
Table 7 presents static results of the probability of being poor or very poor, comparing the full 
sample with the panel households in 1990 on the hand one and one logit model for 2002 
including the conflict shocks on the other hand. Larger households, land-poor households and 
female headed households are more likely to be poor or very poor in the full sample as well as 
for both years in the panel. The statistical significance of several explanatory variables differs 
between the full sample and the panel, but not the magnitude of the effects. Remark that, in 
2002, the death of male adults reduces a household’s probability to be poor. The loss of land 
increases the probability to be very poor. These static effects will be explored further in the 
next sections. 
 
5.4 Poverty dynamics profiles  
 
Tables 8 and 9 present our analysis of the movement in and out of poverty between the two 
rounds of the survey. Table 8 illustrates changes in household poverty dynamics across several 
household characteristics such as location, household size, age, sex, education and occupation 
of the head of the household, and size of land owned by the household. Table 9 shows changes 
in poverty dynamics across the different conflict-related shocks observable at the household 
level. These include the ethnic characteristics of the household (an important element of the   28
Rwandan genocide and surrounding conflicts), the number of male and female adults that died 
in the 1990-1996 period and in the 1997-2002 period (we include two periods to distinguish 
between a potential difference in long term and short term effects), whether or not a household 
saw its house been destroyed in those two periods, the amount of land lost in the two periods 
(in most cases because of distress sales or intergenerational transfer), or whether or not the 
household had any member in prison during the survey period (after the genocide, 
approximately 100 000 people were imprisoned).   
 
The tables show that the percentage of young heads of household decreased significant 
between the two years (more than halved). In 2002, the majority of households are headed by 
someone over 60 years old. This is due to the fact that the same households were observed 12 
years after the first interview, but also to the loss of young male adults in the conflict. Changes 
in the gender of the head of household support this: there was a large decrease in number of 
male-headed households between the two years. The number of female-headed households in 
Gikongoro and Gitarama more than doubled between 1990 and 2002. The tables show also 
slight changes in the number of adult equivalents. 
 
The number of non-educated heads of household decreased by around 10 percentage points 
between 1990 and 2002. In the same time period, the number of heads with incomplete and 
complete primary school increased, while there was no change in the number of household 
heads with more than primary school education. This indicates that the heads of households in 
2002 who were not head in 1990 (mostly women) were better educated than those that they 
replaced. We observe a slight increase in number of household heads employed in farming 
activities, accompanied by decreases in non-farm employment. This is consistent with the first 
observations: women are generally more likely to be employed in farming.  
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The number of households with smaller land holdings increased significantly between 1990 
and 2002, while the number of larger land holdings decreased. The problems of population 
growth and land scarcity have not stopped with the genocide.
19 After 1994, households have 
continued to sell (parts of) their land, to rent it out and to give parts of it to their sons. At the 
time of the survey, there was no policy of land consolidation. Over time and generations, this 
leads to smaller and smaller land sizes per household. The Gini coefficient on land inequality 
rose from 0.44 in 1990 to 0.59 in 2000.
20  
 
55.1% of all households in our sample remained poor in both years, while 18% moved out of 
poverty and 20.2% became poor in 2002. Only 6.7% of all households remained non-poor in 
both 1990 and 2002. As with the headcount estimates, these values cover important differences 
across the sample. A large number of households from our panel in Gitarama (27.4%) fell 
below the income poverty line in 2002. Poverty dynamics estimates for Gikongoro show a 
reverse picture: only 8.3% of households in this province fell into poverty, while a substantial 
33.3% became non-poor 12 years later. These results are closely replicated when using the 
lower food-only poverty line. 
 
Households that owned large land holdings (> 1 hectare) in 1990 were more likely to fall into 
poverty in 2000, but not households owning between 0.66 and 1 hectare in 1990. André and 
Platteau (1998) and Verwimp (2003) have demonstrated that land-rich households had a higher 
probability to fall victim to deadly violence (murder) compared to land-poor households. What 
we now see is that such targeting also has long-term economic consequences: owners of 
relatively large plots of land before the genocide were worse of after the genocide compared to 
before. 
                                                 
19 For an analysis of land issues, we refer to a briefing paper by The African Centre for Technology Studies, Land 
Reform, Land scarcity and post-conflict reconstruction, Eco-Conflicts, Volume 3, Number 3, October 2004. 
20 Authors’ own calculations from the 1990 and 2000 cross section data.   30
 
Movement into and out of poverty were more frequent for Tutsi heads of households compared 
to Hutu heads. Falls into poverty and extreme poverty were most notably among households 
headed by a young male with incomplete primary school, employed in farming activities. Tutsi 
households that were poor in 1990 were more likely to be non-poor in 2002. The same is true 
for households headed by an older, educated male, employed in non-farming work. Estimates 
based on the food poverty line show slight differences: movements out of extreme poverty 
were highest for Tutsi households headed by older females (not males) employed in low-
skilled off-farm activities. This would be consistent with female-headed households being 
typically found amongst the very poor. Poverty changes between 1990 and 2002 in the two 
provinces seemed to have lifted some of these households out of extreme forms of poverty. 
Off-farm low-skilled employment seems to have been an important motor for such changes. In 
the next section, we analyse in further detail the determinants of these changes in poverty status 
amongst Rwandan households between 1990 and 2002. 
 
6. Determinants of poverty dynamics in Rwanda 
 
6.1 Empirical approach 
 
Several models have been proposed in the literature to analyse the impact of economic shocks 
on changes in household consumption expenditure, income or earnings (e.g. Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin, 1993; Townsend, 1994; Dercon, 2004). There is, however, a scarcity of models that 
estimate directly the effects of conflict-related changes on poverty or on poverty dynamics. The 
objective of this section is to estimate the direct impact of shocks directly related to the 1994 
Rwandan genocide on household poverty dynamics between 1990 and 2002. To that effect, we   31
make use of multinomial logit models,
21 and reduced-form models of changes in income. 
Multinomial logit regressions are commonly used to model processes that involve a single 
outcome among several alternatives that cannot be ordered (for example, choices between 
modes of travelling, occupational choices, etc). Poverty dynamics between two periods can be 
divided into four mutually exclusive outcomes: (i) being poor in both periods, (ii) being non-
poor in the first period and poor in the second period, (iii) being poor in the first period and 
non-poor in the second period and (iv) being non-poor in both periods. Independence between 
the four outcomes is tested using a Hausman chi-squared statistic (Greene, 2000).
22  
 
The multinomial logit model determines the probability that household i experiences one of the 






































.    (5) 
 
In the equations above, Yi is the outcome experienced by household i,  βk are the set of 
coefficients to be estimated and xi includes aspects specific to the individual household as well 
as to the choices. β0 has been set to zero (i.e. β0 has been defined as the base category) in 
order to identify the model (Greene, 2000). All other βk are estimated in relation to this 
benchmark.  
 
                                                 
21 Glewwe, Gragnolati and Zaman (2002) and Justino and Litchfield (2004) use a similar model to estimate the 
impact of trade shocks on household poverty dynamics in Vietnam during the 1990s. 
22 The hypothesis of no independence is rejected for all models reported in table 10.    32
From the model above, we can compute J log-odds ratios  [ ] i j i ij x P P
'
0 ln β = . The log-odds 
ratios (also called relative risk ratios) can be normalised on any other probability, which will 
yield  [ ] ) ( ln
'
0 k j j i ij x P P β β − =  (Greene, 2000). For convenience, we have calculated in tables 
8 and 9  [] ) 0 ( ) 2 ( ln 0 1 = = i i Y P Y P  and  [ ] ) 3 ( ) 1 ( ln 0 1 = = i i Y P Y P . These models represent, 
respectively, the risks of a household escaping and falling into poverty.
23 Results for these 
models are presented in table 10. Explanatory variables are those outlined in the previous 
section: household characteristics plus changes in poverty transitions attributed directly to 
specific conflict shocks observable at the household level. 
 
Discrete poverty functions of the one described above tend, however, to be criticised on the 
grounds that they introduce measurement errors by using arbitrarily defined poverty lines (see 
Deaton, 1997 for discussion). This is a particularly serious problem in analyses that use 
developing countries data sets, since large numbers of households may be concentrated around 
the poverty line. On the other hand, more conventional income or earnings functions will 
impose constant parameters across the entire consumption distribution. This feature may, in 
turn, limit their application to the analysis of the impact of shocks on household poverty 
transitions if the determinants of household welfare yield different returns to the poor and the 
non-poor (Appleton, 2002). In fact, it is possible to have situations in which some households 
may experience decreases in consumption expenditure without becoming poor, and vice-versa. 
Due to the advantages and disadvantages entailed by the two models, we compare and contrast 
both in what follows.  
 




 is the relative risk ratio for a unit change in the variable x: a relative risk ratio (rrr) of less than one means 
that the variables decreases the probability of the household to be in the base category, whereas an rrr of more 
than one increases the probability of the household being in the alternative state.    33
The model is an adaptation of the models used by Dercon (2004) and Justino and Litchfield 
(2004) to analyse the impact of economic reforms household poverty using, similarly to us, 
micro-level panel data. The base model used is the following:  
 
it it it it ct it i it it X S S h k y y ε δ θ η γ υ α + + − + + + + = −
− − − − ) ln (ln ln ln ln ln 1 1 1 1 .    (3) 
 
where  it y  is the level of income per adult equivalent in year t, α is a common source of income 
growth across all households,  i ν  represents the household-specific fixed effects,  i k  represents 
the household level of capital per capita and  c h  is a vector of commune or region level of 
capital (infrastructure, institutions and so forth),  it S  is a multiplicative risk resulting from 
specific shocks that affects the technology coefficient. This risk can be idiosyncratic or 
common to all households in a particular commune or region (see Dercon, 2004). Finally,  it X  
are household variables that vary across time and  it ε  is a stochastic error term with zero mean. 
Results are given in table 11. Table 11 includes several different variations of model (3). In 
columns 1 and 2, we present the estimation results of model (3) using change in the logarithmic 
function of household income per adult equivalent (in real terms). Columns 1 and 3 show the 
results for the estimation of model (3) using total change in household log income as the 
dependent variable. We use the two estimation procedures in order to assess how corrections 
for household size impact on our estimation results. Columns 5 and 6 re-estimate the results in 
column 1 by separating the sample into households that were poor and non-poor in 1990. The 
objective of this exercise is to examine further the differential impact of household 
characteristics and conflict shocks on the poor and non-poor (see Appleton, 2002). 
 
Referring to our discussion on attrition in section (5.2) and tables (4a) and (4b), the model in 
(3) is likely not to be estimated properly. We have therefore corrected for these problems using   34
the Heckman procedure. The first stage of this procedure is exactly the same as the Probit 
model presented in the last column of table 4b. Selection instruments are those variables that 
came out significantly different between attrited and non-attrited households as well as 
variables that were expected to be relevant given the nature of the conflict. The Heckman 
procedure then constructs and estimate of the inverse Mills ratio and produces an OLS 
regression on the income variable with estimates corrected for sample attrition.
24 For a formal 
presentation of the sample selectivity correction model, we refer to Heckman (1979) and Vella 




The effect of household characteristics and commune variables 
 
The results in table 10 (columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 – model 1) illustrate interesting effects of 
household and commune characteristics on the dynamics of poverty amongst Rwandan 
households in the 1990-2002 period. In general, household size in 1990 did not determine 
significantly the chances of Rwandan households escaping or falling into poverty. The 
variable, however, increases significantly the probability of any given household having a 
higher income in 2002. Land size in 1990 impacted only on the probability of any given 
household falling into poverty: households with larger land holdings had increase probability 
(1%) of falling below both general and food poverty lines. This result is replicated in table 11: 
one more unit of land decreased household incomes by 0.2% in 2002 (0.1% in the corrected 
model). The result is statistically significant amongst households that were above the poverty 
                                                 
24 At least one variable in the selection equation does not turn up in the subsequent income estimation.   35
line in 1990 (column 6, table 11). As stated before, what is driving these results is that land-
rich households were targeted in the genocide. 
 
Female headed households fare worse than male-headed households, a result in line with other 
findings in the development economics literature. The level of education and the type of 
employment held by the head of the household did not seem to influence significantly the 
likelihood of a given household escaping poverty. However, they do affect the likelihood of 
falling into poverty: households with more educated heads and with heads employed outside 
farming activities are less likely to fall below the poverty line between 1990 and 2002. The 
effect of these variables on food poverty is not statistically significant. The most significant 
impact relates to household ethnicity: Tutsi households had a high probability of escaping 
poverty. Ethnicity did not affect household movements into poverty. Referring to our 
discussion of tables 8 and 9, we already noticed that more Tutsi than Hutu moved into poverty 
or escaped poverty. The effect of ethnicity proves to be statistically significant and positive for 
the escape from poverty but not for the movement into poverty in the multinomial logit 
analysis (table 10). When we correct for selectivity in the income regression (table 11) this 
effect disappears. 
 
Commune level variables have some, though not large impact on poverty dynamics of 
Rwandan households. Distance to market seems only to affect the probability of households 
falling into poverty: the larger the distance of any given household to local markets, the higher 
the probability of that household having fallen below the food poverty line between 1990 and 
2002. This result is again strengthened by the results in table 11. Households living in higher 
altitudes had a 1% increase in the probability of escaping general and food poverty. Higher 
levels of altitude also impact positively on income changes between 1990 and 2002, in 
particular for households that were poor (table 11, column 5). The interpretation of the effect of   36
altitude is not straightforward. It could be that this variable picks up unobserved commune 
level effects. High altitude may have served as a protection for some of the (worst) effects of 
the conflict, not accounted for by our household or individual level covariates. 
 
The effect of land losses 
 
A large number of Rwandan households were affected by land losses between the two survey 
years. In the 1990-1996 period, 14% of the households included in our sample lost land, 
whereas 21.8% households loss some percentage of their land holdings between 1997 and 2002 
(table 9). The main reasons for the loss of land are the transfer of land to a son and the sale of 
land out of need for cash. Given the importance of land amongst assets of Rwandan 
households, it is not surprising that this variable has affected the levels of poverty amongst our 
sample households (see model 1, table 10, columns 1, 2, 5 and 6). Land losses between 1990 
and 1996 or between 1997 and 2002 resulted in large decreases in the probability of a given 
household moving out of poverty. In addition, the loss of any land between 1997 and 2002 
increased the probability of a household to fall into absolute poverty by over 170%, and to fall 
below the food poverty line by around 4%. It also contributes towards the decrease in incomes 
per adult equivalent by 36% (table 11), in particular for those households that were not poor in 
1990 (column 6, table 11). The impact of recent losses appears to be more severe then the 
impact of older losses. 
 
 
The effect of death of household members 
 
One the most visible impact of the Rwandan genocide was its death toll. This has had 
significant effects on changes in households’ welfare status. The estimates in table 10 (model   37
1) show that the death of adult male in period between 1990 and 1996 increased considerably 
the probability of a household escaping poverty. We obtained a similar result for death of adult 
male and female between 1997 and 2002 when using food poverty line. However, death of 
adult female in the 1990-1996 period decreased probability of escaping poverty.  
 
In order to try to understand these effects further, we have run a second model (model 2 in 
table 10), which disaggregates the variables above into violent and non-violent deaths. The 
results show that both non-violent and violent deaths of adult males impact on the probability 
of households escaping poverty. These non-violent deaths are almost all caused by disease. For 
women, the deaths in the 1997-2002 period - of which 90% caused by disease – also have a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the escape from poverty for the affected 
households. The female deaths during the period of the genocide and civil war, be it violent or 
non-violent, had a negative effect on the escape from poverty. Caution is warranted in the 
interpretation of these results as we did not correct for sample selectivity in table 10, an issue 
we now turn to. 
 
These results are only partially repeated in the OLS regressions on the change in income in 
table 11. The loss of an adult male has a positive and significant effect on income per adult 
equivalent (models 1 and 2), but only for non-violent male deaths and only in the most recent 
period. Exactly the same effect shows up in the case of female adult death: only non-violent 
death and only in the most recent period. We recall that the death of women - violent and non-
violent - was an important factor in our analysis of attrition (tables 4a and 4b). The percentage 
of households who lost women was much higher in the attrited compared to the panel 
households. This most likely explains the difference between the multinomial and Heckman 
corrected results. 
   38
The likely explanation for the results above is that although household members who are ill do 
not contribute to household income generation, they do need to consume from the generated 
income. As a result, in terms of income per adult equivalent incomes, surviving household 
members will benefit from higher incomes per adult equivalent once the ill household member 
dies. Once we correct for selectivity, the violent death of an adult, most probably healthy and 
productive, as well as deaths that occurred more than 5 years ago, do not have a positive effect 
on the escape from poverty. 
 
We find extra evidence for our interpretation that this story is driven by disease when we look 
at the total income regressions at the level of the household (models 3 and 4 in table 11; in 
these models the dependent variable is not divided by the number of adult equivalents): none of 
the labour shocks has a statistically significant effect (-/+) on changes in income, neither in the 
uncorrected nor in the corrected model. Thus, the deaths from disease of male and female 
adults seem to have no negative effect on household income and a positive effect on the 
income of the surviving household members expressed in adult equivalents. 
 
The effect of property destruction and imprisonment 
 
As discussed in section 2, the conflict in Rwanda during the 1990s led to the destruction of 
assets, such as houses and the imprisonment of a large number of individuals. These events 
have affected the poverty status of households in our sample. The destruction of a house in the 
1990-1996 period – in 90% of the cases because of violence (own calculations from survey) – 
led to a decreased probability of escaping poverty and a significant decrease (62%) in average 
incomes (table 11). The destruction of house in the 1997-2002 period – in 90% of the cases due 
to excessive rain (own calculations from survey) – led to a significant increase in the 
probability of a households falling below the food poverty line. Both these effects, in the early   39
period because of violence and in the recent period because of excessive rain, are statistically 
significant for households who were non-poor in 1990 (column 6 in table 11). This result is 
replicated in the results in table 10 showing a fall into poverty for these households.  
 
The imprisonment of a household member did not have a very significant impact on household 
poverty dynamics or in changes in income status, except for a decrease in the probability of 
households escaping from extreme levels of poverty. We remark that Rwandan households 
bring food to their imprisoned household members, meaning that he (most prisoners are adult 






We have presented an analysis of the dynamics of poverty in rural Rwanda spanning a period 
of violent conflict from 1990 to 2000 and 2002. We aimed to contribute to the understanding of 
the effect of violent and non-violent shocks on household welfare. We included violent and 
non-violent demographic shocks, violent and non-violent asset shocks as well more traditional 
covariate economic shocks such as rainfall. Three stories emerge from our analysis of the panel 
data on Rwandan households. First, previously land-rich, income non-poor households have 
fared badly over the decade spanning the conflict. We already knew that these households were 
badly affected by the genocide and the conflict as a whole. The results in this paper suggest 
further that this has affected the economic well being of the surviving household members. In 
particular, the destruction of the house and the loss of land have had a negative impact on their 
welfare, measured by income per adult equivalent. Second, previously land-poor, income poor 
households were able to move out of poverty when an adult member – female or male – who   40
suffered from disease, died. We obtained this result after correcting the income regression for 
identified selectivity biases. The result is valid for models using income per adult equivalent as 
a measure of welfare. As it would be expected, total household income does not decrease or 
increase when an adult dies, but surviving members have more income when measured in 
terms of adult equivalents. We remind that we obtained this result for a rural economy struck 
by extreme land scarcity, absence of technological innovation in agriculture and lack of capital. 
Third, female headed households are trapped in poverty. They are more likely to be poor and 
when poor are less likely to move out of poverty. This shows that female headed households 
should be a prime beneficiary of development aid. 
 
Acknowledging that our data come from a small panel, we have linked our poverty dynamics 
analysis to cross-sectional household data sets, both nationally representative; one collected 
before the genocide, one collected after. We first demonstrated the existence of income 
convergence across provinces: previously poor provinces have grown much more than 
previously richer ones. We linked this result to the differential effect of the four conflict shocks 
at the provincial level. From the analysis, we derive that poverty has increased slightly over 
time in the whole of the rural areas, with large changes in poverty over provinces. We show 
evidence for strong similarities between our panel data results and the findings in the cross-
sections. Losses of capital (house, land) during the 1990s decreased incomes per adult 
equivalent in the household panel. This effect offers also a robust explanation for provincial 
level income changes in the cross-sections. Losses of labour were found to lead to opposite 
effect, though this effect is explained in the household panel by non-violent events (illness). 
The latter may be an indirect effect of the conflict shocks due to lack of health care, but illness 
does not have to be related to the conflict per sé.    41
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Map is modelled after Christine Deslaurier for FIDH/Human Rights Watch -1996. 
Arrows show the advance of the RPF. The shaded area was occupied by the French Army under 
the Operation Turquoise from mid-June till September 1994 
  
Table 1a: Percentage change in labour/capital ratios in Rwanda’s provinces 1990-2000 
Province  Δ (labour/ 
land)2 






Kibungo 8  6  -5 2  90  10  6 
Rural Kigali1  -4  1  261  8 42  8 6 
Ruhengeri  16  8  640  9 45  9 8.67 
Byumba1 11  7  29 5  20 5  5.67 
Gisenyi 18  10  823  10  12  3  7.17 
Gitarama 1  4  27 4  35 7  5 
Butare  -5  2  200  7 25  6 4.67 
Cyangugu  18  10  -47  1 18  4 5 
Kibuye  0  3  174  6 12  3 3.83 
Gikongoro  5  5  25  3 7  1 3 
             
All Rural   6    113    31     
Souces: Population and surface data (Census 1991 and 2002); number of cattle and (FSRP 2000-2002); number 
of new settlements (EICV 1999-2001 Community Survey); 
Notes:  
1. The province of Byumba covers a different area in 1990 compared to 2000 because of administrative reforms. 
In this table we have taken the 2000 area for comparison, meaning that we dropped the Akagera parc and two 
former communes from the 1991 surface and population figure. Same issue for Rural Kigali that lost surface to 
Kigali Capital in the 2000 administrative reform. For reason of comparability we choose the 2000 borders and 
substracted the relevant areas and population from the 1991 figure. 
2. Columns 1, 3 refer to the percentage change in the ratios between 1990 and 2000. 
3. Column 5 refers to the percentage of survey cites (cells) in the 1999-2001 EICV Survey that is home to a new 
settlement (imidugudu). Each province had 40 survey sites. 
4. Columns 2, 4 and 6 are the ranking of each outcome. In a land-scarce, capital poor, densely populated 
economy such as Rwanda, high values for the change in labour/capital ratios indicate a worsening evolution. 
5. Column 7 is the average rank on the three ratios. 
 
Table 1b: Intensity of different shocks at the province level 1990-2000 
Province Genocide  Civil  war  Immigration  (Counter)  Insurgency  Sum 
  L K  L  K L K  L K   
Kibungo  1 0  1  -2  -2  1  0 0  -1 
Rural  Kigal  1 0  1  -2  -2  1  0 0  -1 
Ruhengeri  0 0  1  -2  -1  0  1 -2  -3 
Byumba  0 0  1  -2  -1  0  0 0  -2 
Gisenyi  0 0  0  0 0 0  1 -2  -1 
Gitarama  1 0  0  -1  0 0  0 0  0 
Butare  2 -1  0  -1  0 0  0 0  0 
Cyangugu  2 -1  0  0 0 0  0 0  1 
Kibuye 2  -1 0 0  0  0  0  0  1 
Gikongoro  2 -1  0  0 0 0  0 0  1 
Source: Authors’ evaluation based on Desforges (1999),Verwimp (2003), Global IDP Project (2005);  
Note: The four shocks (genocide, civil war, immigration and (counter)insurgency) are explained in the text. We 
make five assumptions to construct a shock index describing the effect of these shocks on the rural economy in 
each province. Our aim is to see what drives the changes observed in table 1a. (1) Each shock has an impact on 
both factors of production (labour and capital), but there is a dominant impact on either capital or labour; (2) the 
impact, be it the dominant or the secondary impact can be negative or positive. In a land-scarce, capital poor, 
densely populated economy, we assume that a shock has a negative (positive) impact on the economy when it 
augments (reduces) labour and destroys (increases) capital; (3) We believe (see below) that the shocks of 
genocide and immigration are dominant on labour and that the shocks for civil war and the (counter)insurgency 
are dominant on capital; (4) the level of intensity of the shock can be 0 (not intense), 1 (moderately intense) or 2 
(very intense); (5) We also assume that the difference between the level of intensity of the shock on the dominant 
and the secondary factor of production can only be 1 unit  (in absolute values), for example (0 and 1) or (-1 and 
2). We do the latter in order not to make too much of the distinction between the dominant and the secondary 
effect as all these shocks affect both factors of production. The sum is the shock index. This remains a subjective 
exercise, but we believe it reflects lived experiences on the ground and remains very close to the literature. Four 
observations illustrate this:   49
1.  The first column reflects very close to the percentage of Tutsi at the provincial level before the 
genocide, where one distinguishes provinces with high, low and medium % of Tutsi. Thus, the impact of 
the genocide on labour was particularly severe in provinces with a high % of Tutsi. 
2.  The believe/assumption that capital destruction is not the dominant effect of genocide (but labour is) is 
derived from the observation that during the genocide, capital was not so much destroyed as it was 
redistributed. Most frequently from Tutsi to Hutu. Land, cattle and furniture were redistributed on a 
massive scale during the genocide. Even among Hutu: in several locations of earlier fieldwork the local 
Interahamwe leader was killed at the moment he wanted to attack rich local Hutu, after having killed 
(and robbed) the local Tutsi. Also, while the data in table 3a do capture more effects than the effect of 
genocide, the data on inequality show that inequality has increased in all provinces, but least in those 
most affected by the genocide (the southern and south-western provinces). 
3.  Immigration not only adds people, it also adds cattle, as demonstrated by the rising number of cattle in 
areas with many former refugees. Since not all refugees bring cattle or other capital with them, but all 
bring labour, we believe the effect on labour is dominant; 
4.  The assumption that the effect of civil war and (counter)insurgency is dominant on capital is based on 
observations during the civil war, such as the damage inflicted on the Ntaruka power station by the FPR 
and the dismantling of the Cyangugu tea factory by the departing FAR. 
 
 
Table 1c: Rank correlation (Spearman’s rho) between income, growth rate, Δ L/K ratios and shocks 
Measure  Income 1990  Growth rate  
1990-2000 
(in table 2) 







1 -0.842***  0.683**  -.0804*** 
Growth rate 1990-2000 
(in table 2) 
 1  -0.567*  0.679** 
Δ L/K 1990-2000 
(average rank, table 1a) 
   1  -0.856*** 
Shocks 
(sum, table 1b) 
     1 
*** significant at the 1% level; **5% level; *10 % level 
Note: Ranking the provinces on the basis of four indicators yields high and statistically significant correlations, 
supporting the usefulness of the exercises undertaken in tables 1a and 1b.  
 




















Kibungo  22494 1  56822 1  17430  -0.26  10 
Rural  Kigal  15151 2  38930 8  11942  -0.24  9 
Ruhengeri  14160 3  54260 3  16648  0.16  7 
Byumba  12949 4  52536 4  16115  0.22  6 
Gisenyi  12937 5  56603 2  17363  0.29  4 
Gitarama 11954 6  50875 5  15606  0.27  5 
Butare 9624  7  35743  10 10964  0.13  8 
Cyangugu 9217  8  41803  6  12823  0.33  3 
Kibuye 8857  9  41691  7  12788  0.37  2 
Gikongoro 7804  10  38931  8  11942  0.43  1 
             
All  Rural 12600   48000   14724  0.16   
Source: Agricultural Household Survey (DSA, 1990), EICV (1999-2001) 
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Figure 1 : Initial income and the growth rate of income per province, 1990-2000 
 
When regressing the equation (as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992) 
 













r , we obtain  
 
Linear Regression of the growth rate on initial income 
Dependent variable  coefficient  t-value  Significance 
Income 1990  -0.64E-05  -4.346  0.002*** 
constant 0.751  5.344  0.001*** 
      
N=10     
Rsq = 0.702       
*** significant at the 1% level 
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Y1990  conflict 
shocks 
Δ L/K  Y2000 
growth rate  
 
Table 3a : Household poverty and inequality in rural Rwanda 1990-2000 
































All Rural  12600 14724  16.9  69.7  72.0  3.3  52.4  55.0  5.0 0.41  0.51  24.4 
Province                        
Butare 9624  10964  13.9  80.5  80.1  -0.5  65.2  65.8  0.9  0.36  0.47  30.6 
Buymba 12949  16115  24.4  64.3  70.1  9.0  49.7  53.3  7.2  0.39  0.55  41.0 
Cyangugu 9217  12823  39.1  88.2  75.3  -14.6  77.1  61.2  -20.6  0.41  0.51  24.4 
Gikongoro 7804  11942  53.0  85.5  77.5  -9.4  73.9  61.5  -16.8  0.43  0.45  4.7 
Gisenyi 12937  17363  34.2  67.9  71.8  5.7  50.0  52.0  4.0  0.39  0.54  38.5 
Gitarama 11954  15606  30.6  66.2  64.9  -2.0  47.0  48.7  3.6  0.34  0.49  44.1 
Kibungo 22494  17430  -22.5  35.4  59.3  67.5  15.1  40.0  164.9  0.35  0.44  25.7 
Kibuye 8857  12788  44.4  93.4  74.6  -20.1  74.8  59.1  -21.0  0.40  0.45  12.5 
RuralKigali   15151  11942  -21.2  55.8  77.5  38.9  34.4  62.1  80.5  0.38  0.53  39.5 
Ruhengeri 14160  16648  17.6  69.8  74.0  6.0  50.6  53.1  4.9  0.44  0.55  25.0 
Umutara -    -  -  62.7  -  -  45.0  -    0.53  - 
Gender                         
Male 12746  16390  28.6  69.0  69.1  0.1  50.9  51.9  2.0  0.40  0.53  32.5 
Female 10934  11260  3.0  73.2  77.8  6.3  58.7  61.0  3.9  0.41  0.45  9.8 
Age of the head                        
20-30 14853  18482  24.4  61.4  65.3  6.4  39.0  45.9  17.7  0.39  0.54  38.5 
30-40 12022  16450  36.8  72.5  68.9  -5.0  54.6  52.7  -3.5  0.39  0.55  41.0 
40-50 10902  12041  10.4  73.4  77.4  5.4  57.5  61.5  7.0  0.41  0.47  14.6 
50-60 11908  13814  16.0  69.2  75.2  8.7  54.6  57.3  4.9  0.40  0.52  30.0 
+60 12634  13699  8.4  68.0  70.5  3.7  50.9  54.1  6.3  0.41  0.47  14.6 
Size in adult eq                        
0-3 16252  17445  7.3  56.1  62.1  10.7  37.8  42.8  13.2  0.43  0.49  14.0 
3-6 12273  13838  12.8  71.2  74.7  4.9  54.6  57.6  5.5  0.41  0.51  24.4 
+6 10760  13302  23.6  75.8  78.0  2.9  58.2  64.0  10.0  0.39  0.54  38.5 
Education                        
None 10516  11532  9.7  75.0  78.0  4.0  59.2  61.8  4.4  0.38  0.53  39.5 
Primary 13320  16116  21.0  66.3  70.1  5.7  46.6  52.1  11.8  0.39  0.53  35.9 
>Primary 41640  26397  -36.6  17.1  42.3  147.4  8.0  27.7  246.3  0.44  0.47  6.8 
Occupat.                        
Farming 11654  13170  13.0  71.5  74.1  3.6  53.3  56.3  5.6  0.38  0.48  26.3 
Agr labour  8108  11264  38.9  90.1  76.8  -14.8  80.8  62.2  -23.0  0.41  0.46  12.2   53 
N-agr Lab  22818  28718  25.9  34.1  36.5  7.0  23.9  21.6  -9.6  0.42  0.46  9.5 
Business 14551  82052  463.9  55.3  23.9  -56.8  39.9  14.6  -63.4  0.29  0.67  131.0 
Adm, prof  47558  34799  -26.8  0.0  15.8  -  0.0  9.0  -  0.37  0.37  0.0 
Source: Agricultural Household Survey (DSA, 1990), EICV (1999-2001) 
Notes: The Poverty Line is defined at 49.575 RwF per adult equivalent per year in 2000 and 13.300 RwF per adult equivalent in 1990. The Extreme or Food Poverty Line is 
defined as 35.000 RwF per ae in 2000 and 9.400 Rwf in 1990. For calculation of these Poverty Lines we refer to the text. The samples are population weighted: N (1990) is 




Table 3b Mean real household income and underestimation of income per income quintile in RwF per year* 
  Mean  Median  Poorest 20%  Second quintile  Third quintile  Fourth quintile  Richest 20% 
Real Income            
Real  income  1990  58.429 40.291 14.326 27.679  40.776  63.580  145.962 
Real income 2000  62.563  36.624  7.985  22.414  37.039  59.732  185.687 
% difference 2000-1990  +7  -9  -44  -19  -9  -6  +27 
Underestimation of 2000 income            
Average underestimation in % of income  1.6    3.2  1.3  1.0  1.1  1.2 
% with no underestimation  95.6    91.5  96.8  96.6  96.9  95.9 
% with less then 3% underestimation  3.2    5.2  1.8  2.9  2.6  3.8 
% with more the 3% underestimation  1.2    3.2  1.3  0.5  0.6  0.4 
Source: Agricultural Household Survey (DSA, 1990), EICV (1999-2001) 
Notes: *Only households living in the rural areas are included as household level data for urban Rwanda in 1990 are not available 
  
Table 4a: Testing for selection attrition, comparing means for households in the 1990 sample 
  178 hh with two 
observations 
65 dropped hh or 
hh with new 
head 
T-statistic on  
diff. in means 
Characteristics of the household     
Residing  in  Gitarama  66.3 52.3 3.97** 
Residing  in  Gikongoro  33.7 47.7 3.97** 
Household  size  5.53 4.42 -3.33*** 
Adult equivalents  5.01  3.9  -3.53*** 
Age  of  head  51 46 1.97* 
%  head  female  16.3 27.0 3.44* 
% of hh with Tutsi head  7.9  11.3  0.676 
% of hh with educated head  44.4  40.6  0.271 
Size of cultivated land  0.99  0.69  -3.21*** 
Size of cultivated land per ae  0.223  0.195  -1.21 
Household income for A season   22946  16634  -2.55** 
Income per ae, A season  5105  4721  -0.65 
Number  of  cattle  0.75 0.40 -2.32** 
Altitude  1724 1775 1.48 
Distance to market  4.16  4.28  0.62 
%  poor  72.5 73.8 0.045 
% extreme poor  57.9  69.2  2.58 
     
Shocks     
% hh with male adult violent death 94-96  13.5  12.3  0.058 
% hh female adult violent death 94-96  1.1  9.2  9.8*** 
% hh male died 1990-96  19.7  26.2  1.19 
% hh female adult died 1990-96  7.9  30.8  20.75*** 
Rain  levels  738 777 2.002* 
Source: Rwanda panel household survey 1990-2002. 
 
 
Table 4b:Probit models testing for selective attrition, using FGM method* 
 Model  1 
 
Model 2  Model 3 
Constant  -2.15** (2.31)  2.24** (2.05)  0.30 (0.72) 
      
Characteristics of the household      
Log Household income   0.243*  (2.38)     
Household size  0.089** (2.20)    0.15 ***(3.04) 
Log Income per adult equivalent    -0.165 (1.31)   
Size of cultivated land    0.003 ** (2.26)  0.003 * (1.74) 
Number of cattle    0.37 (0.37)  -0.027  (0.27) 
Head Tutsi    -0.33 (1.11)  0.30 (0.76) 
Age of head    -0.014** (2.40)  -0.012** (2.00) 
head female    -0.25 (1.08)  -0.037  (0.15) 
Province of residence    0.38 * (1.81)  0.29 (1.41) 
      
Shocks      
Female adult violent death 94-96      -1.19** (1.97) 
Female adult death 90-96      -0.90 *** (3.07) 
      
Pseudo R-squared  0.06  0.08  0.19 
Goodness of fit (Chi2)  249.18  243.89  274.53 ** 
Source: Rwanda panel household survey 1990-2002. 
Notes: * All models are clustered around survey cites to obtain robust standard errors; z statistics in 
absolute values are in parenthesis; Fitzgerald, Gottschalk and Moffitt (1998) 
  
Table 5: Poverty and inequality within population subgroup in Rwanda (n = 178) 


























Entire Sample      73.1  75.3  3.0  57.9  66.9  15.5  0.397  0.549  38.3 
    Gikongoro  3223  8709  170.2  91.7  66.7  -27.3  83.3  56.7  -31.9  0.459  0.587  27.9 
    Gitarama  6010  5435  -9.6  62.4  80.3  28.7  44.9  72.0  60.4  0.332  0.505  52.1 
Sex of head                     
    Male  5308  7431  40.0  70.5  74.5  5.7  55.7  66.4  19.2  0.387  0.566  46.3 
    Female  3866  4987  29.0  86.2  79.3  -8.0  69.0  69.0  0.0  0.427  0.488  14.3 
Ethnicity                     
    Hutu  5156  6475  25.6  73.1  77.5  6.0  56.2  68.7  22.2  0.396  0.558  40.9 
    Tutsi  4929  7059  43.2  66.7  60.0  -10.0  66.7  53.3  -20.1  0.336  0.478  42.3 
Age of head                     
    20-30  6760  7007  3.7  47.4  89.5  88.8  42.1  73.7  75.1  0.377  0.439  16.4 
    30-40  5532  7830  41.5  71.9  82.5  14.7  54.4  75.4  38.6  0.334  0.616  84.4 
    40-50  3616  4428  22.5  83.3  83.3  0.0  73.3  70.0  -4.5  0.483  0.413  -14.5 
    50-60  4569  6399  40.1  79.4  70.6  -11.1  58.8  64.7  10.0  0.350  0.484  38.3 
    60+  5142  8023  56.0  73.7  55.3  -25.0  57.9  50.0  -13.6  0.420  0.618  47.1 
No of Adult Eq.                     
     0-3  7320  9916  35.5  48.5  69.7  43.7  30.3  57.6  90.1  0.316  0.500  58.2 
     3-6  5024  5666  12.8  73.1  75.3  3.0  60.2  67.8  12.6  0.399  0.520  30.3 
     +6  3734  5501  47.3  88.5  78.9  -10.8  71.2  71.2  0.0  0.374  0.561  50.0 
Education of head                     
    No schooling  4095  5290  29.2  80.8  75.8  -6.2  66.7  65.7  -1.5  0.406  0.512  26.1 
    Primary  5952  6946  16.7  65.2  76.4  17.1  47.2  69.4  47.0  0.348  0.541  55.4 
    >Primary  9859  15754  59.8  42.9  57.1  33.1  42.9  57.1  33.1  0.322  0.590  83.2 
Head occupation                     
     Farming  5570  3438  -38.3  72.7  75.8  4.3  56.5  67.1  18.8  0.514  0.465  -9.5 
     Non-farming  5020  5170  3.0  76.5  70.6  -7.7  70.6  64.7  -8.4  0.380  0.390  2.6 
Land size (in hect.)                     
    0-0.33  3845  6028  56.8  88.2  94.1  6.7  76.5  88.2  15.3  0.407  0.524  28.7 
    0.33-0.66  4513  5584  23.7  73.5  75.5  2.7  61.2  59.2  -3.3  0.390  0.535  37.2 
    0.66-1  5646  4345  -23.0  67.5  62.5  -7.4  42.5  57.5  35.3  0.355  0.410  15.5 
    +1  5914  9298  57.2  67.3  72.3  7.4  54.6  67.3  23.3  0.389  0.582  49.6 
Source: Rwanda panel household survey 1990-2002.  56
 
Figure 3: Cumulative distribution functions, Rwanda 1990, 2002 
 
    
inc





Source: Rwanda panel household survey 1990-2002. 
Note: Incomes are expressed in 1990 real prices. The cut-off line in the graph of 
24000 RwF is roughly three times the size of poverty lines used in the paper 
 
 
Table 6: Share (%) of between-group inequality in total inequality in Rwanda 
  1990 2002 
  G(0) G(1) G(0) G(1) 
Group:      
Province 13.25  13.85  4.84  4.55 
Ethnic  3.64 2.69 0.19 0.17 
Adult  equivalent  8.94 10.38 5.77  5.73 
Age  of  head 5.30 5.77 5.03 4.38 
Gender of head  1.99  2.31  3.35  2.87 
Education  of  head  9.27 11.92 6.15  6.58 
Occupation of head  0.33  0.38  0.74  0.67 
Land  size  4.64 5.00 6.33 5.90 
Source: Rwanda panel household survey 1990-2002. 
Notes: G(0) and G(1) represent, respectively, mean logarithmic deviation (also known as the Theil’s second 
measure) and the Theil inequality index. 
   57 
Table 7: Probability of being poor and very poor in Rwanda (logit model, estimates are odds ratios) 
  Probability of being poor  Probability of being very poor 
    in  1990,  n=238  in 1990, panel, 
n=178 
in 2002, panel, 
n=178 
in  1990,  n=238  in 1990, panel, 
n=178 
in 2002, panel, 
n=178 
Household characteristics          
Household size 1990  1.67 ***  1.70***  1.09       1.67 ***  1.67**  1.06 
Size of cultivated land  0.99 ***  0.99***  1.00      0.99 ***  1.00**  1.00 
Characteristics of the head             
Sex (1=female)  2.03 *   2.41*  3.23**      1.81   1.76  2.65** 
Age   1.10  1.08*  0.90      0.99  0.97  0.91 
Squared age  0.99  1.00**  1.00      1.00  1.00  1.00 
Education (yes/no)  0.58  0.53  0.40      0.49 **  0.46**  0.63 
Farmer (yes/no)  0.42  0.59  0.43      0.67   0.93  0.48 
Ethnicity (1=tutsi)  0.50 *  0.58  0.20     1.17  1.44  0.20* 
Commune variables            
Altitude  1.00 *  1.00  1.00**      1.00 ***  1.00**  1.00*** 
Distance to market  0.65 **  0.68*  1.06      0.54 ***  0.56***  1.17 
Shocks            
Rainfall  1.00 *   1.01**  1.00      1.00 ***  1.01***  1.00 
Loss of land 90-96      1.24      1.77 
Loss of land 97-02      2.83      3.43** 
Death adult male 90-96      0.39**      0.73 
Death adult male 97-02      0.37*      0.26*** 
Death adult female 90-96      3.93      2.60 
Death adult female 97-02      0.69      0.68 
House destroyed 90-96      4.57      3.32 
House destroyed 97-02      1.28      2.67* 
Adult in prison      0.62      1.22 
            
Pseudo R-squared  0.280  0.296  0.203           0.30  0.302  0.211 
Goodness of fit   Chi2=253.31 *  Chi2 = 221.8***  Chi2 = 197.8**   Chi2= 226.92    Chi2 = 179.2*  Chi2 = 179.31** 
Source: Agricultural Household Survey (DSA, 1990), EICV (1999-2001) and Rwanda panel household survey 1990-2002. Notes: * statistically significant at 10%, 
** statistically significant at 5%, *** statistically significant at 1%. 
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Table 8: Poverty dynamics for panel (household characteristics) (n = 178) 
P → P  P → NP  NP → P  NP → NP    % sample 
in 1990 
% sample 
in 2002  Poverty   Food 
poverty  
Poverty   Food 
poverty  
Poverty   Food 
poverty  
Poverty   Food 
poverty  
Entire Sample      55.1 40.5 18.0 17.4 20.2 26.4  6.7  15.7 
Province             
        Gikongoro  33.7  33.7 58.3 48.3 33.3 35.0  8.3  8.3  0.0  8.3 
        Gitarama  66.3  66.3 53.0 36.4  9.4  8.5  27.4 35.6 10.3 19.5 
Age of head             
        20-30  10.7  4.50 36.8 26.3 10.5 15.8 52.6 47.4  0.0  10.5 
        30-40  32.0  12.4 61.4 43.9 10.5 10.5 21.1 31.6  7.0  14.0 
        40-50  16.9  29.8 70.0 56.7 13.3 16.7 13.3 13.3  3.3  13.3 
        50-60  19.1  23.0 58.8 41.2 20.6 17.7 11.8 23.6  8.8  17.7 
    60+  21.4  30.3  39.5  29.0  34.2 29.0 15.8 21.1 10.5 21.1 
Sex of head             
        Male  83.7  63.5 52.4 38.9 18.1 16.8 22.2 27.5  7.4  16.8 
        Female  16.3  36.5 69.0 48.3 17.2 20.7 10.3 20.7  3.5  10.3 
No of Adult Eq.             
     0-3  18.5  21.9  33.3  18.2  15.2 12.1 36.4 39.4 15.2 30.3 
          3-6  52.3  42.7 54.8 40.9 18.3 19.4 20.4 26.9  6.5  12.9 
     +6  29.2  35.4  69.2  53.9  19.2  17.3  9.6  17.3  1.9  11.5 
Education of head             
        No  schooling  55.6  45.5 61.6 46.5 19.2 20.2 14.1 19.2  5.1  14.1 
        primary  40.45 50.56  48.6 33.3 16.6 13.9 27.7 36.1  6.9  16.6 
        >Primary  3.9  3.9  28.6 28.6 14.3 14.3 28.6 28.6 28.6 28.6 
Head occupation             
          Farming  90.4  94.4 54.0 39.1 18.6 17.4 21.7 28.0  5.6  15.5 
          Non-farming  9.6  5.6  64.7 52.9 11.8 17.7  5.9  11.8 17.7 17.7 
Land size (in hect.)             
    0-0.33  19.1  29.9  85.3  67.7  2.9  8.8  8.8  20.6  2.9  2.9 
        0.33-0.66  27.5  27.7 55.1 36.7 18.4 24.5 20.4 22.5  6.1  16.3 
    0.66-1  22.5  14.7  40.0  25.0 27.5 17.5 22.5 32.5 10.0 25.0 
        +1  30.9  27.7 47.3 38.2 20.0 16.4 25.5 29.1  7.3  16.4 
Source: Rwanda panel household survey 1990-2002. 
Notes: P = poor; NP = non-poor.  59 
Table 9: Poverty dynamics for panel (conflict shocks) (n = 178) 
P → P  P → NP  NP → P  NP → NP    % sample 
in 1990 
% sample 
in 2002  Poverty   Food 
poverty  
Poverty   Food 
poverty  
Poverty   Food 
poverty  
Poverty   Food 
poverty  
Ethnicity of the head             
Hutu  90.0  90.0 57.5 41.3 15.6 15.0 20.0 27.5  6.9  16.3 
Tutsi  8.4  8.4  33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 26.7 20.0  6.7  13.3 
Adult men died 90-96             
No    80.9  80.9 57.6 42.4 16.0 16.0 19.4 25.0  6.9  16.7 
Yes  19.1  19.1 44.1 32.4 26.5 23.5 23.5 32.4  5.9  11.8 
Ad. female died 90-96             
No  92.1  92.1 52.4 38.4 18.9 17.7 22.0 27.4  6.7  16.5 
Yes  7.9  7.9 85.7  64.3 7.1 14.3 0.0 14.3 7.1  7.1 
Adult men died 97-02             
No  92.7  92.7 56.4 42.4 17.0 15.8 20.6 26.7  6.1  15.2 
Yes  7.3  7.3  38.5 15.4 30.8 38.5 15.4 23.1 15.4 23.1 
Ad. female died 97-02             
No  91.0  91.0 55.6 40.7 16.7 16.7 20.4 26.5  7.4  16.1 
Yes  9.0  9.0  50.0 37.5 31.3 25.0 18.8 25.0  0.0  12.5 
House destroyed 90-96             
No  90.4  90.4 55.3 39.8 18.6 18.0 19.9 26.7  6.2  15.5 
Yes  9.6  9.6  52.9 47.1 11.8 11.8 23.5 23.5 11.8 17.7 
House destroyed 97-02             
No    91.0  91.0 55.6 40.7 18.5 17.9 19.1 24.7  6.8  16.7 
Yes  9.0  9.0  50.0 37.5 12.5 12.5 31.3 43.8  6.3  6.3 
Lossed land 90-96             
No  86.0  86.0 54.3 39.9 17.7 19.0 20.9 25.5  7.2  15.7 
Yes  14.0  14.0 60.0 44.0 20.0  8.0  16.0 32.0  4.0  16.0 
Lossed land 97-02             
No  79.2  79.2 53.2 38.3 19.9 20.6 19.2 24.1  7.8  17.0 
Yes  21.8  21.8 62.2 48.7 10.8  5.4  24.2 35.1  2.7  10.8 
In prison             
No  92.1  92.1 54.3 39.6 18.3 18.9 20.7 26.2  6.7  15.2 
Yes  7.9  7.9 64.3  50.0  14.3 0.0 14.3  28.6 7.1 21.4 
Source: Rwanda panel household survey 1990-2002. 
Notes: P = poor; NP = non-poor. 
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Table 10: Movement in and out of poverty and extreme poverty 2002-1990, (multinomial logit model, estimates are rrr) (n =178) 
  Movement out of poverty/extreme 
poverty (model 1) 
Movement out of poverty/extreme 
poverty (model 2) 
Movement into poverty/extreme 
poverty (model 1) 
Movement into poverty/extreme 
poverty (model 2) 
  P to NP 
(1) 
VP to NVP 
(2) 
P to NP 
(3) 
VP to NVP 
(4) 
NP to P 
(5) 
NVP to VP 
(6) 
NP to P 
(7) 
NVP to VP 
(8) 
Household characteristics             
Household size 1990  0.94  1.11  0.94  1.06  1.02  0.85  1.09  0.84 
Size of cultivated land  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.01***  1.01*  1.01**  1.00* 
Characteristics of the head               
Sex (female=1)   0.23*  0.40  0.19**  0.35  1.47  2.65  1.99  2..03 
Age 1.04  0.88  1.00  0.91  0.93  0.86  0.82  0.84 
Age squared  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Education (educated=1)  2.21  1.90  3.48  2.57*  0.11***  0.90  0.28*  1.04 
Occupation (non-farmer=1)  0.75  2.59  0.65  2.46  0.001***  0.19  0.004***  0.23 
Ethnicity (1=tutsi)  17.86***  23.21**  14.23**  19.42**  1.33  0.46  2.15  0.48 
Commune variables               
Altitude 1.00***  1.01***  1.00**  1.00***  1.00  1.00**  1.00  0.99* 
Distance to market  1.01  1.11  0.91  0.96  0.81  1.64*  0.78  1.63* 
Shocks               
Rainfall 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.15***  1.00  1.15***  1.00 
Loss land 90-96  0.57  0.28***  0.95  0.37**  1.52  1.45  2.38  1.43 
Loss land 97-02  0.40  0.11**  0.43  0.15**  171.5***  4.54**  55.85**  4.07* 
Viol death adult male 94-96      2.72*  5.37*      3.19  3.05 
Non-viol death male 90-96       22.70***  10.91**      1.20e+10  3.81 
Non-viol death male 97-02      8.57***  39.33***      0.70  0.66 
Total death male 90-96  8.41***  10.84***      14.84  2.36     
Total death male 97-02  3.41  10.46**      0.02**  0.31**     
Viol death adult fem 94-96      8.59e-16***  6.27e-19***      0.08**  0.77 
Non-viol death fem 90-96       2.80e-15***  3.80      0.018***  6.65e+09*** 
Non-viol death fem 97-02      4.07*  5.73*      4.17+e08  2.33 
Total death female 90-96  0.07***  0.47      2.76e-21  1.82     
Total death female 97-02  4.37*  6.34*      9.12e+09  2.13     
House destroyed 90-6  0.09**  0.025**  0.11**  0.054**  1.65  1.52  0.68  1.35 
House destroyed 97-2  0.48  0.58  0.43  0.72  3.32  6.60**  1.36  6.20** 
Adult in prison   3.17  5.87e-15***  2.72  2.31e-18***  3.21  1.07  1.57  1.09 
                
Pseudo R2  0.381  0.346  0.366  0.356  0.381  0.346  0.366  0.356 
Hausman statatistic  336.2***  34.2***  16.1***  2.4***  336.2***  34.2***  16.1***  2.4*** 
Source: Rwanda panel household survey 1990-2002. Notes: *, **, *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%. P/NP = poor/non-poor; VP/VNP = very poor (food poverty line).   61 
Table 11: Change of log income per adult equivalent and change of log income 2002-1990, linear regression and Heckman sample selectivity model 
Change in log income per adult 
equivalent 









Change in log 
income per ae for 
the poor only 
(5) 
Change in log income 
per ae for the non-
poor only 
(6) 
Household characteristics        
Household  size  1990  0.14*** 0.16*** 0.046*  0.12*  0.12*** 0.087 
Size of cultivated land  -0.002  -0.001  -0.0016  -0.0002  0.000  -0.004*** 
Characteristics  of  the  head        
Sex  (female=1)  -0.02 -0.03 -0.16 -0.19 -0.098  0.29 
Age  0.004 0.001 -0.006  -0.015  -0.02 0.045 
Age  squared  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
Education  (educated=1)  -0.106 -0.11  -0.002 -0.023 -0.247 -0.19 
Occupation  (non-farmer=1)  0.079 0.066 0.12  0.16  -0.48 1.36*** 
Ethnicity  (1=tutsi)  0.35 0.39 0.36 0.48 0.57 0.058 
Commune variables        
Altitude  0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.02**  0.001* 
Distance to market  -0.229**  -0.23***  -0.218***  -0.222***  -0.26**  -0.084 
Shocks        
Rainfall  0.001 0.007 0.009 0.0007  0.001 -0.008*** 
Loss  of  land  90-96  -0.01 0.01  -0.12 -0.09 -0.062  -0.18 
Loss of land 97-02  -0.36*  -0.36*  -0.47**  -0.46**  -0.08  -0.81** 
Violent death adult male 1994-96  0.14  0.16  0.014  0.05  0.24   0.22 
Non-violent male death 90-96  0.10  0.10  -0.13  -0.14  0.30  -0.49 
Non-violent male death 97-02  0.50**  0.52*  0.30  0.36  0.70*  0.18 
Violent  death  adult  female  94-96  -0.46 -0.99 -0.27 -1.88 -0.65 - 
Non-violent  female  death  90-96  0.23 0.03 0.36 -0.23  0.11 - 
Non-violent female death 97-02  0.48  0.49*  0.37  0.42  0.57  0.37 
House  destroyed  90-96  -0.57 -0.59**  -0.50 -0.57    -0.44 -1.24*** 
House  destroyed  97-02  -0.28 -0.29 -0.33 -0.36 -0.02 -0.57** 
Adult  in  prison  -0.31 -0.32 -0.09 -0.11 -0.24 -0.28 
Constant  -4.57*** -4.68*** -3.46*** -3.78*** -3.71*  -1.91 
        
Mills  Lambda     0.48   1.46    
Wald  Chi2   142.89  ***   66.68  ***    
R-squared  0.46   0.39   0.46 0.60 
Source: Rwanda panel household survey 1990-2002. Notes: * statistically significant at 10%, ** statistically significant at 5%, *** statistically significant at 1%. (+) These 
regressions are Heckman selection models where the estimates for the selection variables are not shown. The selection equation is exactly the same as the last probit model in 
table 4b, where the estimation results can be consulted. 